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Abstract
This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions
can act as Stackelberg leaders. We dene a value function which modies the -value
function by letting members of deviating coalitions move rstin choosing a coordinated
strategy. We accordingly dene the -core, and characterize the -core allocations of a
cartel formation game and of a public goods economy.
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1 Introduction
The traditional representation of cooperative games with transferable utility is based on a
characteristicfunction, specifying for each coalition the amount of utility that its members
can ensure themselves in the underlying normal form game. This formulation is meant to
isolate coalitional decisions, abstracting from the strategic complexity of the cooperation
process. However, unless the payo¤s of the members of a coalition and of its complement
are independent (orthogonal games) or opposite (constant sum games), the characteristic
function fails to be well dened1. Indeed, this is the case of many meaningful strategic
situations, in which the payo¤ of each player may generally depend on the strategies of all
This paper is published as Iowa State Economic Report, Iowa State University, June 1998.
yCorresponding author, Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street WC2A
2AE, London; Phone:+44-171-9557418, Fax: +44-171-5860009, E-mail: MARINIM@LSE.AC.UK and Univer-
sity of Urbino, Via Sa¢ 2, Urbino, Phone: +722-327117.
1 In Shubik (1982) terminology, the game is not a c-game.
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players in the game. In such cases, the characteristic function can still be well dened by
introducing some assumptions on the strategies of players in the complementary coalitions
(the outside players).
One way to deal with this problem, rst proposed by von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)
and considered by Aumann (1967), is to assume that outside players coordinate their strate-
gies to minimize the aggregate payo¤ of the forming coalition. A temporal structure is
implicitly introduced in the playerschoice of strategies. In the so called -core, the forming
coalition acts as a leader, and chooses its best strategies, given the minimizing behaviour of
outside players; in the -core, conversely, it behaves as a follower, and maximizes its payo¤
given the coordinated strategies of outside players. Since in both cases deviations are very
costly,  and -core are usually very large. Moreover, still fullling a rationality require-
ment in constant sum games,  and -assumptions do not seem justiable in most economic
settings2.
An alternative approach proposed by Aumann (1959) extends Nash Equilibrium passive
expectations to the cooperative framework. The concept of strong equilibrium dened by
the author assumes that deviating coalitions take as given the strategies of outside players.
Being immune from the deviations of any coalition, thus including the grand coalition and
every individual player, strong equilibria are both Nash equilibria and e¢ cient strategies.
However, since in games with positive externalities the e¢ cient strategies of excluded players
make coalitional deviations tooprotable, strong equilibria do not exist for many economic
problems.
In the contest of some recent economic applications, a di¤erent approach has proved useful
in ensuring a non-empty core without making use of extreme assumptions on the behaviour
of outside players such as the  and  conjectures. This approach, named -approach by
Chander-Tulkens (1997), assumes that outside players neither jointly minimize the payo¤
of a deviating coalition (as in the  and -core), nor keep their strategies xed (as in the
Strong Nash Equilibrium), but they rather maximize their own utility as singletons. Here, the
behaviour of deviating players and which of outside players is implicitly assumed to develope
in two stages. In the rst stage, similarly to the   game by Hart and Kurtz (1983),3 a
2 Indeed, in costant sum games, the -core coincides with the modied characteristic function proposed by
Harsanyi (1959), assigning to each coalition the solution of the variable threats Nash bargaining problem with
the respective complementary coalition.
3The   game is indeed a strategic coalition formation game with xed payo¤division, in which the strategies
consist of the choice of a coalition. Despite the di¤erent nature of the two games, there is an analogy concerning
the coalition structure induced by a deviation from the grand coalition. In the   game, any deviation from
the the grand coalitions strategy prole induces a coalition structure in which the deviating coalition stay
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coalition forms and the excluded players split up as singletons; in the second stage, members
of the deviating coalition and excluded players simultaneously choose their strategies in the
underlying normal form game, given the specic coalition structure originated in the rst
stage. Consequently, the strategy prole induced by the deviation of a coalition S  N is
the Nash equilibrium among S and each individual player in NnS.
In this paper we modify the -assumption by removing this two stage structure and
reintroducing the temporal sequence in the choice of players strategies in the underlying
normal form game, typical of the  and -core. We assume that the formation of a coalition
and the choice of a coordinated strategy by its members in the underlying game are two
simultaneous events, that can be thought of as a unique action. When a set of players
form a coalition, at the same time they choose a coordinated strategy, taking as given the
(non-cooperative) reaction of the excluded players as singletons. In this respect, deviating
coalitions possess a rst mover advantage with respect to the outside players. We thus
associate with the deviation of every coalition S the Stackelberg equilibrium in which S acts
as leader and players in NnS play (individually) as followers.
According to this assumption, we dene a modied version of the -core, denoted -core.
We then show how some recent applications of the -core to oligopolistic markets and public
goods production problems are a¤ected by our assumption. For the linear oligopoly case, we
prove that, although the -core is very large, the only allocation in the -core is the equal
split allocation. For the linear-quadratic oligopoly, conversely, we show that, di¤erently from
the -core, the -core is empty. For the case of public goods production, we consider a simple
economy with one public and one private good, and we discuss the validity of Chander and
Tulkens (1997) result of non-emptiness of the -core. We consider the case of symmetric
agents, and show that if preferences are linear in the public good, then the allocation the
authors propose belongs to the -core. However, if preferences are strictly concave, the -core
is shown to be empty for the specic case of quadratic utility and quadratic cost.
2 The general set-up
Let   = (fXi; uigi2N ; fXSgSN ) be a strategic form game, where N is the (nite) players
set, Xi is the strategy set of player i, and XS is the strategy set of a coalition of players S.4
Let P (N) be the set of all possible partitions  of the players set N ; let X denote the set
together and the outside players split up.
4Note that, in general, XS may not coincide with the set
Q
i2S
Xj .
3
Q
T2
XT , for any  2 P (N). The set X 
S
2P (N)
X is the set of all possible outcomes (in
terms of strategies) of the game  . The function ui : X ! R+ represents playerspreferences.
We restrict our attention to transferable utility functions ui:
Denition 1 A Nash Equilibrium of   is a strategy prole x such that, for all i 2 N , xi 2 Xi
and, for all xi 2 Xi, ui (x)  ui (xi; x i).
2.1 The value function under the -assumption
The -assumption postulates that the worth of a coalition is the aggregate utility of its
members in the Nash equilibrium between that coalition (acting as a single player) and the
outside players (acting as singletons). The value function v(S) is dened for all S  N by:
v(S) =
X
i2S
ui

x^S ; fx^jg
j2NnS

(1)
where,
x^S = argmax
xS2XS
X
i2S
ui

xS ; fx^jg
j2NnS

(2)
and, 8j 2 NnS,
x^j = argmax
xj2Xj
uj

x^S ; fx^kgk2(NnS)nfjg ; xj

: (3)
Denition 2 The joint strategy bx 2 XN is in the -core, if there exists no coalition S such
that v (S) >
P
i2S
ui (bx).
2.2 The value function under the -assumption
The new value function we introduce is based on the assumption that deviating coalitions
exploit a rst-mover advantage. As under the -assumption, when a coalition S forms,
players in NnS split up as singletons. Di¤erently from the  case, the members of S choose
a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the players in NnS, who
simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy prole associated to the
deviation of a coalition S is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game in which S is the leader
and the players in NnS are, individually, the followers. We denote this strategy prole as a
partial equilibrium with respect to S. Formally, this is the strategy prole ~x (S) = (~xS ; xj(~xS))
such that
~xS = argmax
xS2XS
X
i2S
ui

xS ; fxj(xS)g
j2NnS

(4)
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and, 8j 2 NnS,
xj(xS) = argmax
xj2Xj
uj

xS ; fxk(xS)gk2(NnS)nfjg ; xj

: (5)
We rst establish su¢ cient condition for the existence of ~x (S).
For every coalition S  N and strategy prole xS 2 XS , we dene the restriction
  (NnS; xS) of the game   to the set of players NnS, given the xed prole xS .
Proposition 1 Let   be a strategic form game. For every S  N and xS 2 XS, let the game
  (NnS; xS) possess a unique Nash Equilibrium. For every S  N , let XS be compact. Let
each players payo¤ be continuous in every other players strategy. Then, for every S  N ,
there exists a partial equilibrium of   with respect to S. Moreover, if payo¤s are strictly
concave in each players strategy, such a partial equilibrium is unique.
Proof. By condition (5), the strategy prole fxj(xS)gj2NnS is the unique Nash equilibrium
of   (NnS; xS). By the closedness of the Nash equilibrium correspondence (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pag.30), members of S maximize a continuous function over a
compact set (condition (4)); thus, by Weiestrass Theorem, a maximum exists. Uniqueness
comes as a straightforward consequence of the strict concavity of the leaders maximization
problem.
We can thus dene the value function v(S) as follows:
v(S) =
X
i2S
ui
exS ; fxj(exS)gj2NnS : (6)
Denition 3 The joint strategy ex 2 XN is in the -core, if there exists no coalition S such
that v (S) >
P
i2S
ui (ex).
In the next to sections we apply the concept of -core to two widely studied economic
problems: cartel formation in oligopolies and resource allocation in economies with public
goods.
3 Cartel formation in oligopoly
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the application of cooperative solution
concepts to the problem of cartel formation under oligopoly [see, for a survey, Bloch (1997)].
A specic use of the -core is contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989). The author shows
that in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic costs, for a number
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of rms n  3, rms never chose to stay separate (i.e., giving rise to the coalition structure
f1; 1; :::; 1g); moreover, it is proved that, for n  4, the -core is non empty.
In what follows, after a short description of the Cournot setting, we rst show that, in
a symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and linear costs, the -core strictly includes the
equal split allocation for any number of rms. For the same model specication we then
prove that the equal split allocation is the unique allocation contained in the -core. Finally,
we show that, when costs are quadratic, the -core can be empty.
3.1 The Cournot setting
Let i (y; yi) = p (y) yi   Ci (yi) be the prot function of every rm i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng,
where yi is the output of a rm, y =
nP
i=1
yi the total output, p (y) the usual inverse demand
function and Ci (yi) the cost function of every rm. Let also Ci (:) = Cj (:), for every i, j in
N .
We introduce the following standard assumptions:
A.1 The function i (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable;
A.2 For every rm i, the capacity constraint yi <1 determines the maximum production
level;
A.3 p00 (:) yi + p0 (:) < 0 and p0 (:)  C 00i < 0.
Consistently with Section 2, we now dene the normal form game, denoted as  1, associ-
ated to our problem. Each player (rm) strategy set is:
Xi = fyi 2 R+ : yi  yig  Yi: (7)
Playerspreferences are linear in prot and, for every coalition S, the strategy set is repre-
sented by:
XS 
(
(yS ; tS) : yS 2
Y
i2S
Yi; and tS = (t1; :::; ts); such that
X
i2S
ti = 0
)
(8)
where tS is a vector of transfers.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game  1.
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Proof. By A.1, every players payo¤ functions is continuous in the strategy prole y 2 YN
and, by A.3, strictly concave on yi. By A.2, strategy sets are non empty, compact and convex,
so that existence of a Nash equilibrium follows. Uniqueness is implied by A.3 as follows. Since,
for each rm, p00yi+p0 < 0 and p0  C 00i < 0, the function F (yi; y)  p0yi+p C 0 is decreasing
both in yi and y. In fact,
@F (yi;y)
@yi
= p0  C 00i < 0 and @F (yi;y)@y = p00yi + p0 < 0 . Suppose now
that there exist two Nash Equilibria y1 and y2 of  1. Suppose also, without loss of generality,
that y1 > y2. At a Nash Equilibrium, p0yi + p  C 0i = 0, so that, if
nP
i=1
y1i >
nP
i=1
y2i , it follows
from A.3 that y1i < y
2
i for every i = 1; ::; n, leading to a contradiction.
3.2 The -core
By applying the denition of v (S) to the Cournot setting introduced above, we obtain the
following expression:
v (S) =
X
i2S

p (y^S ; y^ S) y^i   Ci (y^i) + bti (9)
where
y^S = arg max
ys2YS
X
i2S

p (yS ; y^ S) yi   Ci (yi) + bti (10)
and where bti is the equilibrium lump-sum transfer for every i 2 S, and
y^j = argmax
yj2Yj
p
0B@yj ; y^S ; y^k
k 6=j
k=2S
1CA yj   Ci (yj) ; 8j 2 NnS: (11)
By A.1, we can di¤erentiate v (S) and, by symmetry of players, the strategy prole y^ 2 YN
characterizing v (S) is such that, for every i 2 S, y^i respects:
p (y^) + p0 (y^) sy^i = C 0i (y^i) ; (12)
where s = jSj, while, for every j 2 NnS, y^j respects:
p (y^) + p0 (y^) y^j = C 0j (y^j) : (13)
3.3 The -core
We now apply our equilibrium concept to the oligopolistic setting described above. According
to the general setup, the function v(S) is as follows:
v(S) =
X
i2S
h
p

~yS ; fyj(~yS)gj2NnS

~yi   Ci(~yS) + ~ti
i
(14)
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where
~yS = argmax
yS2Y S
X
i2S
h
p

yS ; fyj(yS)gj2NnS

yi   Ci(yi) + ~ti
i
(15)
and 8j 2 NnS,
yj(yS) = argmax
yj2Y j
p

yS ; fyk(yS)gk2(NnS)nfjg ; yj

yj   Cj(yj): (16)
Note rst that, as
P
i2S
~ti = 0, the function v(S) is fully dened by the choice of a vector ~yS
by the members of S.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique value v (S) for every S  N:
Proof. We apply Proposition 1. By Proposition 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for
every restricted game  1 (NnS; yS). Continuity of payo¤s follows from A.1 and compactness
of every strategy set from A.2. Moreover, by A.3 payo¤s are strictly concave, so that the
value v (S) is unique.
According to the above result, under A.1 and symmetry, the FOCs characterizing ey 2 YN
are, for every i 2 S:
p (~y) + p0 (~y) s~yi = C 0i (~yi) (17)
and, 8j 2 NnS,
p (~y) + p0 (~y) yj (~yS) = C 0j (yj (~yS)) : (18)
3.4 The linear case
Having dened the  and -core for the Cournot setting, we now study the linear case, i.e.
the case in which p (y) = a   by, and, for every i 2 N , Ci (yi) = cyi, with a > c  0 and
b > 0.
Proposition 4 Under linearity and symmetry, the -core of the game  1 is non empty and
strictly includes the equal split allocation.
Proof. Conditions (12) implies that:
v (N) =
(a  c)2
(2b)2
and
v (S) =
(a  c)2
b2 (n  s+ 2)2
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where s = jSj and n = jN j :Without loss of generality let us normalize (a c)2
b2
= 1, so that the
equal split allocation gives to each player in N a payo¤ of v(N)jN j =
1
4n and v (S) =
1
(n s+2)2 :
Consider now the equal split allocation for a coalition S, v(S)jSj =
1
s(n s+2)2 . Whatever
distribution of the worth v (S) may be chosen by S, at least one player in S must get a
payo¤ not greater than 1
s(n s+2)2 . This implies that coalition S improves upon the equal
split allocation for N if and only if
1
s (n  s+ 2)2 >
1
4n
:
Straightforward calculations show that the above inequality is satised respectively for:
s > n
s < 2 +
n pn2 + 8n
2
< 1
s > 2 +
n+
p
n2 + 8n
2
> n
and hence, it is never satised for 1 < s  n: It follows that the equal split allocation for N ,
characterized by the strategy vectors
 by;bt ; where by respects (12) and by = (0; 0; :::; 0), belongs
to the -core. To see that this allocation is strictly included in the -core, note that, since
individual deviations assign to a player just v (fig) = 1(n+1)2 <
v(N)
jN j =
1
4n , di¤erent and un-
equal allocations belong as well to the -core. In particular, any allocation giving to a player i
his worth v (fig), and v(Nnfig)jN 1j = v(N) v(fig)jN 1j to any remaining player, is not objectable.
We now characterize the -core of the game  1 under linearity and symmetry. The
next proposition shows that, once deviating coalitions are allowed to exploit a rst mover
advantage, all allocations but the equal split one are blocked.
Proposition 5 In a linear symmetric oligopoly the equal-split allocation is the unique allo-
cation belonging to the -core.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 4, under normalization, we get:
v (N) =
1
4
and, from condition (17),
v (S) =
1
4 (n  s+ 1) :
9
Hence, straightforward calculations show that, for every S  N; v(S)jSj is less than
v(N)
jN j for
1 < s < n, and equal to v(N)jN j either for s = n or s = 1: It follows that, since in any
deviating coalition S  N at least one player gets a payo¤ less than or equal to v(S)jSj , no
coalition S  N can make all its member better o¤ than in the equal split allocation v(N)jN j ,
which is then in the -core. To see that the equal-split is the unique allocation in the -core,
note that any other allocation would require to give to at least one player less than v(N)jN j .
However, such a player could always improve his payo¤ by deviating and, from the result
above, getting a worth equal to v (fig) = 14n .
3.5 The linear-quadratic case
We now consider the case of linear demand function p (y) = a y and quadratic cost function
Ci (yi) =
y2i
2 . As indicated above, we know from Rajan (1989) that, for n = 2, n = 3 and
n = 4; the -core is non empty. We now show that this result does not hold under the -core
assumption.
By conditions (17) and (18), the following result can be proved.
Proposition 6 Under linear demand and quadratic costs for every rm, the -core can be
empty.
Proof. >From rst order conditions, it is obtained that:
v (N) =
a2n2
(1 + 2n)2
and
v (fig) =
a2
 
a2 + 5n  1
(n+ 1) (n+ 5)2
:
Simple calculations show that, for every i 2 N , and for n  2, v (fig) > v(N)jN j . By e¢ ciency
of the equal split solution, in any other e¢ cient allocation at least one player would receive
a lower utility. This fact together with the above result that any player can improve upon
the equal split allocation by deviating as singleton, imply that any e¢ cient allocation can be
objected by the deviation of a single player. This, in turn, implies that the -core is empty.
4 The core of a public good economy
In this section we study the -core of an economy with one private and one public good. We
mostly refer to the work on -core by Chander and Tulkens (1997) (C-T hereafter), and show
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that their results carry over to the -core if and only if preferences are linear in the public
good.5
4.1 The economy
We consider an economy with one public good q and one private good y. The set of agents
is N = f1; :::; ng; each agent i is endowed with !i units of the private good, and produces
the public good out of the private good with convex cost Ci(qi). For every S  N , we
denote by qS the vector (qi)i2S , and by QS the term
P
i2S
qi; for simplicity, we write q instead
of qN and Q instead of QN . Preferences are represented by a quasilinear utility function
ui (q; yi)  vi (Q) + yi. We denote by i(Q)  @vi(Q)@Q the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private good for player i, and for all coalitions S  N , we let S(Q)
denote the term
P
i2S
i(Q).
We make the following assumptions.
A.4: vi (Q) concave, twice di¤erentiable and such that i(Q) > 0 for all q such that
P
i2N
Ci(qi) P
i2N
!i.
A.5: Ci(qi) strictly concave, twice di¤erentiable and such that C 0i(qi)  0 for all qi  0
and C 0i(qi) = 0 for qi = 0.
We associate to this economy the normal form game denoted  2, where strategy sets and
preferences are as follows:
Xi =

(qi; yi) 2 R2+ : C (qi) + yi  !i
	
;
XS =
(
(qS ; yS) 2 R2#S+ :
X
i2S
Ci (qi) 
X
i2S
!i  
X
i2S
yi
)
;
ui (x) = vi (Q) + yi:
Proposition 7 (Chander-Tulkens): There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium of the game
 2.
The Nash Equilibrium (q; y) = (q1; :::; qn; y1; ::; yn) of  2 is characterized by the following
FOCs:
i
 
Q

= C 0i (qi) ; 8i 2 N: (19)
5Although C-Ts results are obtained for an economy with pollution, they generalize to public goods
economies under the assumptions made in this paper.
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4.2 The -core
Chander an Tulkens propose a specic allocation (q; y), bearing for an equilibrium inter-
pretation of the economy E, and show by construction that it belongs to the -core of the
game  2. We report their result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 8 (Chander-Tulkens): The joint strategy (q; y) where:
q is such that N (Q) = C 0i (q

i ) ; for all i 2 N ;
yi = !i   Ci (qi) 
i (Q
)
N (Q)
"X
i2N
(Ci (q

i )  Ci (qi))
#
is in the -core.
In what follows we will refer to (q; y) as the C-T allocation.
4.3 The -core
In this section we analyze the symmetric case (identical players) and we show that under
linear preferences, Proposition 8 carries over to the case of -core. However, we also show
that, if preferences are strictly concave, the -core may be empty.
4.3.1 The function v
By denition, any partial equilibrium [(~qS ; ~yS); (qj ; yj) (~qS ; ~yS)] of  2 with respect to S is such
that
~qS 2 arg max
qS ;yS
X
i2S
vi
0@QS + X
j2NnS
qj (qS)
1A+X
i2S
yi
s.t.
X
i2S
!i 
X
i2S
[Ci (qi) + yi]
and, 8j 2 NnS
qj (qS) = argmax
qj;yj
vj
0@QS + X
k2(NnS)nfjg
qj (qS) + qj
1A+ yj
s.t. !j  Cj (qj) + yj
Proposition 9 For every S  N , there exists a partial equilibrium of  2 with respect to S.
Moreover, all partial equilibria with respect to S are characterized by the same vector ~q.
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Proof. By Proposition 7, the Nash equilibrium of  2 (NnS; qS) exists and is unique for all
S and qS . By continuity of vi, (A.4), and of Ci (qi), (A.5), Proposition 1 can be applied
here. Moreover, as the maximization problem of S can be written as a function of just qS ,
by concavity of vi and strict convexity of Ci (qi), Proposition 1 can again be applied to show
uniqueness.
4.3.2 Some characterization of the partial equilibria of  2
We now analyze in greater detail the partial equilibria of  2.
We rst consider the rst order condition for every player j 2 NnS: by symmetry, we
can write
j (qj + (n  s  1)qj +QS)  C 0 (qj) = 0: (20)
By Assumptions 1 and 2 and applying the implicit function theorem to the mapping f (qj ; qS) 
j ((n  s)qj +QS)   C 0 (qj), we conclude that the function qj (qS) is di¤erentiable. Thus,
totally di¤erentiating the FOC above, we obtain, in equilibrium, the condition
@j
@q

1 + (n  s) @qj
@QS

  C 00 (qj) @qj
@QS
= 0
yielding the reaction function
@qj
@QS
=
@j
@Q
C 00 (qj)  (n  s) @j@QS
< 0:
The term @qj@QS gives us the reaction of player j to changes in the vector qS as determined by
the changes in js Nash equilibrium strategy in the game  2 (NnS; qS).
Given the reaction function of each outside player j, the maximization problem of coalition
S yields the following FOCs:
S

~Q

1 + (n  s) @qj
@QS

= C 0 (~qi) , 8i 2 S. (21)
By plugging the expression for @qj@QS into (21), we obtain
S (QS + (n  s)  qj (qS)) (1  k) = C 0i (qi) (22)
where
0 < (1  k) =
 
(n  s)
@j
@Q
C 00i (qj)  (n  s) @j@QS
+ 1
!
 1: (23)
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Indeed, the presence of the term (1  k) is the only di¤erence between our optimality con-
ditions and the ones obtained by C-T. Comparing the conditions characterizing v and v,
it can be easily checked that the aggregate amount of public good induced by the deviation
of a coalition S under the -assumption is greater than or equal to that induced under the
-assumption.
In order to prepare the analysis of the next section, we establish here some properties of
partial equilibria. We will refer to the original concept of partial equilibrium introduced by
C-T as to the partial equilibria under the -assumption.
Lemma 10 The aggregate amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium with
respect to S is not greater under the -assumption than under the -assumption.
Proof. Let Q (S) and Q (S) be the aggregate levels of public goods in the partial equilib-
rium w.r.t. S under  and -assumption, respectively. Suppose that Q (S) > Q (S); then,
by FOC (20), for each player j 2 NnS, qj (S)  qj (S). Moreover, as (1  k)  1, by FOC
(22) for every player i 2 S, qi (S)  qi (S). The two inequalities imply a contradiction.
Lemma (10) and Proposition 5 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) imply that the aggregate
amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium w.r.t. S under the  assump-
tion is not greater than the e¢ cient one.
Lemma 11 If preferences are linear in the public good, then:
i) qi (S)  qi , 8i 2 N ;
ii) qi  qi (S), 8i 2 N ;
iii) qj = q

j (S), 8j 2 NnS.
Proof. i): By denition of the term (1  k) in condition (23), if preferences are linear then
(1  k) = 1. By condition (22) this implies the following implications for all i 2 S:
C 0i

qi (S)

= S < N = C
0
i (q

i ) :
Similarly, for all j 2 NnS, condition (20) implies:
C 0j

qj (S)

= j < N = C
0
j
 
qj

:
The two implications, together with strict convexity of Ci(:) for every i 2 N , imply the result.
ii) and iii): By conditions (22) and (19), for all i 2 S:
C 0i (qi) = i < S = C
0
i

qi (S)

:
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By conditions (20) and (19), for all j 2 NnS:
C 0j (qj) = j = C
0
j

qj (S)

:
Again by convexity of cost functions, the results follow.
4.3.3 The robustness of Chander-Tulkens result under linear preferences
We are now able to show that under linear preferences for the public good, Proposition 8 by
C-T generalizes to the -core.
Proposition 12 If preferences are linear, then the C-T allocation (q; y) belongs to the
-core.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) can be directly applied using
Lemma (11). Indeed, Lemma (11) establishes all the properties that are needed in the proof
of that proposition.
4.3.4 The -instability of Chander-Tulkens allocation under non-linear prefer-
ences
Under non linear preferences, C-Ts result requires an additional assumption (Assumption 1
in their paper) concerning the marginal rate of substitution characterizing respectively a Nash
and an e¢ cient allocation. Under this assumption, and using a few properties both of Nash
and partial equilibrium allocations under the -assumption, the authors prove Proposition
8 also for the non linear case. Using the notation introduced in the previous sections, such
properties are that qi (S)  qi, for all i 2 S, and that qj (S)  qj , for all j 2 NnS.
It is easy to check that the rst property does not longer hold under the -assumption:
indeed, in C-Ts paper this property is proved through the following chain of implications:
C 0i (q

i (S)) = S (Q
 (S))  S (Q)  j
 
Q

= C 0i (qi) ;
where the inequality S (Q)  j
 
Q

is indeed Assumption 1.
Under -assumption, the above chain of implications would write
C 0i

qi (S)

= S

Q (S)

(1  k)  S (Q)  j
 
Q

= C 0i (qi)
which, as (1  k) < 1 by non-linearity of preferences, may well not be true. Actually, as
Example 1 below shows, linearity turns out to be a necessary condition for C-T result to
carry over under -assumption. Indeed, as it is proved in Proposition (13), in Example 1 the
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-core is empty.
Example 1. Let preference be described by the utility function
ui (q; xi) =
 
Q  Q2+ yi
and let costs be described by the function
C (q) =
q2
2
:
It can be easily checked that Assumption 1in Chander-Tulkens (1997) is satised if   12 .
We consider the deviation of a single player i, producing a zero amount of public good. By
showing that, given the reactions of the other players, this strategy represents for him an
improvement upon the allocation proposed by C-T, we show that he can improve upon it
under the -assumption, as zero production is always a feasible strategy for him. The reaction
of the other (n  1) players to the no productionstrategy of i is obtained by the FOC
1  2qj (n  1) = qj
yielding
qj =
1
1 + 2 (n  1)
and
Q =
n  1
1 + 2 (n  1) :
By using Samuelsons e¢ ciency condition
n(1  2Q) = Q

n
we obtain the e¢ cient level of public good
Q =
n2
1 + 2n2
:
We are then able to compare the utility (ui ) received by i in the C-T allocation with the
utility u0i that i receives through a (zero production) deviation:
ui =
n2
1 + 2n2
  

n2
1 + 2n2
2
  1
2

n
1 + 2n2
2
;
u0i =
n  1
1 + 2 (n  1)   

n  1
1 + 2 (n  1)
2
:
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By straightforward calculations, it turns out that, for n  2 and   0:5,  u0i   ui  is
always positive; hence, every player can individually improve upon the C-T allocation, which,
therefore, is not in the -core. We report in the table below a few numerical values for 
u0i   ui

.
n = 2;  = 0:5
 
u0i   ui

= 0:224
n = 10;  = 0:5
 
u0i   ui

= 0:8
n = 50;  = 0:5
 
u0i   ui

= 0:96
n = 100;  = 0:5
 
u0i   ui

= 0:98
Proposition 13 Let costs and preference be as in Example 1. Then the -core of the asso-
ciated cooperative game is empty.
Proof. It is shown in Example 1 that any player could improve upon C-Ts solution by
exploiting a rst mover advantage. By e¢ ciency of that solution, for any other e¢ cient
solution (q; y), at least one player i would receive a lower utility than in (q; y). But as any
player can improve upon (q; y) by deviating as singleton, than player i can improve upon
(q; y) in the same way.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a new solution concept for cooperative games. Our concept modies
the -core by introducing a temporal structure in the choices of strategies in the underlying
normal form game which is similar to the one adopted in the -core. At the same time, it
is maintained the -assumption that outside players react to a forming coalition by splitting
up into singletons. This approach is meant to account for those cases in which coalitions can
break an agreement and, in so doing, force the outside players to react to their new strategy.
In this paper we have focused our attention on two applications: Cournot oligopolies and
public good provision. Our results on cartel formation show that, in a linear symmetric
oligopoly, considering the -core restricts the set of core outcomes to the equal split allocation.
Moreover, di¤erently from the -core, under quadratic costs the -core may be empty. In the
second application, Chander and Tulkens (1997) results are shown to be robust against the
temporal structure assumed in the -core if and only if preferences are linear in the public
good. In the case of non linear preferences, conversely, whenever a coalition can exploit a
rst mover advantage, the -assumption on coalition formation is no longer su¢ cient to yield
a non-empty core.
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